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A b stra ct This short note concentrates on an optim isation of the a t­
tribute-proving protocol by B atina et al. [1], and provides the improved 
performance figures. The protocol relies on elliptic curve cryptography 
w ith bilinear pairings. These pairings provide signatures th a t are stable 
under m ultiplication w ith  a blinding factor. In  this way multiple proofs 
are unlinkable, and thus provides a privacy-friendly solution.
The optim isation involves better exploitation of the (lim ited) elliptic 
curve primitives th a t are available on the current generation of Java 
C ard  sm art cards. I t leads to  a reduction of the on-card running times 
(wrt. to  [1]) of roughly a factor three. Total running tim es w ith this new 
protocol are below one second. A further reduction w ith a factor two or 
three is needed to achieve performance th a t is acceptable in practice.
K ey  words: anonymous credentials, elliptic curve cryptography, sm art 
card, bilinear pairing, attribu tes, blinding, protocols, Java C ard
1 Introduction
W ith e-ticketing, smart cards replace the use of paper tickets to prove the right 
of the bearer to use the public transportation system.
Smart cards that are currently employed for e-ticketing in public transport 
are typically memory cards with cryptographically protected access for reading 
and writing. Cards have unique identifiers and most of the “intelligence” of the 
whole system lies in the back office. Now tha t the cryptographic protection of the 
most widely used sm art card for e-ticketing, the MIFARE Classic, is broken [2,3], 
this back office plays a crucial role in fraud detection. Fraudulent cards can be 
recognised using a shadow bookkeeping, and their use can be blocked on the 
basis of their card-id.
This back office database with extensive logs of the movements of individ­
ual cards within the system, often linkable to individuals, is not only used for 
fraud detection but also for capacity optimisation, division of revenues between
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different transport companies, law enforcement and direct marketing. W ith the 
growing awareness of the privacy issues involved, the interest in more privacy- 
friendly alternatives increases.
Anonymous credentials are the obvious privacy-friendly technique to use. 
They allow travellers to  use a smart card for e-ticketing in a way tha t is fairly 
similar to paper tickets, namely as a way of proving access rights to public 
transport, without revealing one’s identity. The main problem with anonymous 
credentials in this context is tha t they involve computationally intensive proto­
cols. They require processor-based, instead of memory-based, smart cards, which 
are generally more expensive. But even with the latest generation of processor 
cards, processing speed is a mayor challenge. Typically in the mass transit sector 
the transaction times should be below 300-400 milliseconds, in order to prevent 
queues at entry/exit gates. In contrast, similar processor cards tha t are currently 
used in e-passports don’t have such tight constraints. These e-passport protocols 
easily take a few seconds to complete.
2 Elliptic Curve Background
For the broader context and more background information the reader is referred 
to the original paper [1]. Here we only describe the basics about the underlying 
elliptic curve (EC) primitives such tha t the notation in the optimised protocol 
in Section 3.2 can be understood.
We shall use e( —, —) to denote a bilinear pairing on an elliptic curve. A private 
key s is just a natural number (below some bound). A public key associated with 
the private key s is the result of a scalar point multiplication s • Q, for some fixed 
point Q. Suppose a card c has a public key P c. A signature on this key, for 
instance corresponding to an attribute, created by multiplication with the secret 
key, is thus a point s • P c. It may be given to the card upon initialisation.
The card c can now prove tha t it possesses a signed public key by showing a 
point R, which is claimed to be s • P c. This can be verified on the terminal side 
by checking the equality:
e(Pc, s • Q) =  e(R, Q).
If R  =  s • Pc, then by bilinearity of e both sides are equal to e(Pc, Q )s .
One of the attractions of this kind of signature is tha t it is stable under 
blinding. Instead of the pair (Pc,s  • P c) the card can also present (b• P c,b • (s • P c)), 
using th a t b• ( s • P c) =  s- (b  P c), where b is the blinding factor. Hence the card can 
present different looking credentials each time, making tracing impossible [4].
W hat the terminal needs to check in this scenario is tha t P c really is a public 
key of the card c. It can check using some standard challenge-response mechanism 
that c possesses the corresponding private key. This is what is done in [1], using 
some separate protocol steps, see Section 3.1.
The optimisation tha t is presented in Section 3.2 involves an integration of a 
different challenge-response mechanism in the attribute verification steps. This
makes the protocol shorter and more efficient, especially because it has fewer 
messages and can be implemented entirely using calls tha t are part of the Java 
card API. The earlier version in [1] had to  rely on our own (slow) multiplication 
algorithm for blinding, implemented in Java Card on the card.
3 Protocols for A ttribute-proving
This section describes the optimised version of the elementary protocol designed 
by Batina et al [1]. We describe how a card c demonstrates in a secure and 
privacy friendly manner th a t it possesses some attribute(s) a. This attribute is 
just a number, with certain meaning tha t we abstract away.
3.1  S k etch  o f  th e  O rig in al P r o to c o l
F igu re 1. Sketch of the protocol
Figure 1 sketches the basic protocol for proving an attribute tha t was used 
in [1]. To start, the terminal requests the card to show its credentials (1). The 
card responds (3) with its attribute, certificate and public key. The terminal can 
verify th a t the card actually possesses this attribute by verifying the certificate
(4) which links the attribute to the public key. Finally, in steps (5) to  (8), the 
terminal verifies, using a standard challenge-response mechanism, tha t the card 
actually knows the private key corresponding to the public key. These two parts 
can be combined to reduce the amount of messages sent.
W hat makes this protocol privacy friendly is the blinding of the card specific, 
and thus identifying, values, performed in step (2). By using a fresh blinding for 
each run the terminal will be unable to  link a protocol run to  a previous, or 
future, one.
3.2  The Optimised Protocol
We will now present our optimised version of the above protocol.
System Setup The scheme provider has a public fixed point Q and a finite set of 
attributes. For each attribute a a secret key sa and public key Q a =  sa ■ Q are 
generated. The associated pairs (a, Qa) of attributes and public keys are publicly 
known, and stored in all terminals together with the fixed point Q.
A card c generates a key pair kc, P c =  kc ■ P  where P  is a fixed system wide 
generator. The private key kc of the card is assumed to be stored in a protected 
manner such th a t it cannot leave the card. Upon personalisation the card receives 
its attribute a together with a corresponding certificate C a =  sa ■ P c linking its 
public key Pc to the attribute a. The attribute a corresponds to a product that 
the owner of the card has bought.
kc, Pc = kc ■ P , a, Ca = Sa ■ Pc P , Q, (a, Qa)
F igu re 2. Optimised protocol for proving self-blindable attribu tes
Protocol Description  The protocol for proving self-blindable attributes, as de­
picted in Figure 2, is initiated by a terminal which sends a request, together 
with a point representation of the nonce n  ■ P , to the card. The card generates 
a fresh blinding factor b to  blind its key pair and the certificate. It responds by 
sending a signature b ■ kc ■ (n ■ P ) of the received nonce, which is created using 
its blinded private key b ■ kc, and the blinded values (b ■ P c and b ■ Ca) together 
with the attribute a stored on the card.
The terminal can now perform a pairing signature verification, as discussed 
in Section 2, using the card’s response, the a ttribu te’s public key Qa and the 
fixed point Q. Note tha t the terminal can select the correct public key Qa to use 
by matching the attribute returned by the card. Finally the terminal verifies the 
signature using the blinded public key and the scalar nonce value n. When the 
verification succeeds the card has proved possession of the requested attribute.
3.3  The Implementation
Java Card Applet  In [1] the practical limitations of Java Cards have been de­
scribed th a t have to be taken into account while programming the card. The 
actual operations tha t the card needs to perform are scalar multiplication of 
points. In the end the applet performs the required steps of the protocol in the 
following way.
The difficulty in the Java Card applet is the blinding of the private key. This 
problem has been circumvented by (ab)using the EC key generation operation 
to generate the blinding factor. This function generates a random number which 
it multiplies with the generator point of the elliptic curve. By setting the nonce, 
received from the terminal, as the generator this function produces a private key 
(the blinding factor b) and a public key (the blinded nonce (b ■ (n ■ P )) which we 
can use for the remaining calculations.
Two EC Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement operations (effectively two 
scalar point multiplications) are performed with this generated private key to 
calculate the blinded public key, and the blinded certificate. A third ECDH 
key agreement is performed using the generated public key, the blinded nonce, 
together with the cards private key to generate the signature.
Both operations, key generation and key agreement, use the cryptographic 
coprocessor to perform the necessary calculations. This improves performance 
since there are no longer calculations which have to be done in software, which 
was the drawback from the original implementation.
Terminal Application The implementation of the terminal application is not 
significantly different from the original version. It only contains minor modifi­
cations to incorporate the integration of the challenge-response part in the first 
messages and the new signature check.
3.4  T h e  R e su lts
Using the same parameters as Batina et al. [1] we have tested the performance of 
our optimised version of the protocol. The results of these tests can be found in 
Table 1. The results of the original protocol have been included, for comparison, 
in Table 2. Note th a t we no longer use different blinding lengths since we now 
use the key generator for this, which just uses the elliptic curve parameters.
T able 1. Test results of the optimised protocol for various key lengths
key length 
(bits)
a ttr ib u te  & signature 
(ms)
verification
(ms)
protocol to ta l 
(ms)
communication
(bytes)
192 787 116 904 155
160 645 102 747 135
128 535 82 617 115
Table 2. Test results of the original protocol for various key and blinding lengths
key blinding attribu te  & signature verification protocol communication
(bits) (bits) (ms) (ms) (ms) (bytes)
192 2748 143 2891
192 96 1884 136 2020 168
48 1451 130 1582
160 1860 126 1987
160 80 1355 133 1489 152
40 1113 127 1240
128 1599 91 1691
128 64 1143 93 1237 136
32 927 86 1014
It can be seen tha t there is a significant increase in performance with respect 
to the running times on the card from the original implementation. The smaller 
amount of data which has to  be exchanged during communication allowed us to 
combine the protocol in a single command-response APDU pair, thus reducing 
the amount of messages sent which also has a positive effect on the processing 
overhead.
To get some more information about how the running time is spent on the 
card we measured how long it takes to perform the individual operations. The 
results of these measurements can be found in Table 3. The columns indicate 
the time needed to perform a single operation. The processing overhead is de­
termined by subtracting one key generation and three key agreements from the 
running time on the card.
T able 3. Test results for the A PI primitives
key length key generation key agreement processing overhead
(bits) (ms) (ms) (ms)
192 379 98 114
160 307 78 104
128 242 62 107
On the one hand, performing a scalar point multiplication (a key agree­
ment) is quite efficient, using less then 100 ms for the calculation. On the other 
hand, performing a scalar point multiplication, combined with generating a ran­
dom value, (a key generation) is disappointing, taking more than a factor three 
longer than just the multiplication. A possible explanation is a different calcula­
tion which explains the fact tha t a key generation can return a complete point, 
whereas a key agreement can only return the x-coordinate.
4 Conclusions
This short note presents another small step on the way to  making anonymous cre­
dentials usable in the context of public transport with its tight performance chal­
lenges. Further optimisations are still needed to meet the requirements. These 
improvements could result from (a combination of):
— faster sm art card hardware;
— access to the crypto-coprocessor through a full-fledged crypto-API tha t gives 
access to exactly the functions one needs;
— lower level implementations, not using Java as implementation language, 
but some machine language for more direct access to the processor and 
cryptographic coprocessor on the card.
The third step is the most obvious one, but means tha t one has to give up the 
high-level card-independent feature of Java Card. Another hindrance is that card 
producers do not easily give direct access to the card hardware, or only under 
very severe non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) tha t make it difficult to publish 
any results.
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